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1. Introduction 
The fiscal powers of the Scottish Government have recently been significantly enhanced as a 
consequence of the implementation of the Scotland Act 2012, which required the Scottish 
Parliament to set a Scottish Rate of Income Tax (SRIT) from April 2016. Initially, the SRIT could 
vary from that in the rest of the UK by up to 10p in the pound.1 More extensive powers over 
income tax came into effect in 2017 as a consequence of the Scotland Act 2016, which sought to 
implement the proposals of the Smith Commission (2014). The Scottish Government now has 
the power to set income tax bands, rates and thresholds (but not personal allowances). All 
income tax receipts on wage income collected in Scotland are now received by the Scottish 
Government, with a corresponding adjustment in the block grant, as detailed in the new Fiscal 
Framework. These changes make Scotland one of the most powerful devolved governments in 
the world in terms of the proportion of public spending and tax revenues under their control 
(Bell and Eiser, 2014).  
 
While there has been considerable debate about which tax powers should be devolved, there 
has been much less discussion concerning what should be done with the powers once they are 
devolved. Differences in income tax policy among Scottish political parties did emerge during the 
2016 Scottish Parliament elections, but the current SNP government has no plans for radical 
change in income tax. However, the Scottish Government has decided not to match the UK 
Government’s recent decision to increase the threshold for higher rate tax payers, which will 
create the first income tax differential between Scotland and the rest of the UK (RUK).2  
 
The substantial increase in the degree of fiscal autonomy is of a scale that would allow radical 
change in the structure of the Scottish economy and the nature of Scottish society, but the 
current Scottish Government seems unlikely to pursue this (although it did advocate, during the 
recent UK general election, raising the highest rate of income tax across the UK as a whole). 
However, a number of prominent SNP members have recently suggested that tackling 
inequalities, ensuring a quality health service and maintaining distinctive benefits such as the 
absence of tuition fees and free prescriptions will prove to be unsustainable with current levels 
of taxation, against the background of what is expected to be continuing austerity at the UK level 
(given the outcome of the 2017 general election), exacerbated by the anticipated impacts of 
Brexit. It seems likely that there will be growing pressure on the Scottish Government to 
                                                          
1 Tax rates for all income bands has to be changed equi-proportionately.  
2 See Lecca et al (2017) for a discussion of the parties’ income tax policies.  
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reconsider its position on pursuing a distinctive income tax policy, although it clearly remains 
nervous about the possible reaction of Scottish taxpayers. 
 
The “Scandinavian model” has often been held up as one that Scotland, if it had the necessary 
fiscal powers, might wish to emulate, although the emphasis has typically been on the high level 
(and quality) of public services rather than the associated high level of taxation that characterises 
the Scandinavian economies. Its current tax powers would allow the Scottish Government to 
raise average income tax rates to Scandinavian levels and use the revenues to implement a 
substantial increase in public spending.3 This paper explores the likely consequences of such a 
shift as a contribution to our understanding of the likely impact of Scotland pursuing a 
differentiated income tax policy from that in RUK. It will be critical for any future Scottish 
Government that may be contemplating the use of significant differential income taxes carefully 
to assess the likely implications for the Scottish economy and society. 
 
Section 2 begins by identifying some key characteristics of the Scandinavian economies, prior to 
providing a brief analysis of the likely economic impact of the substantial balanced budget fiscal 
expansion that a move towards the Scandinavian model would require.4 The wage bargaining 
process proves to be a crucial determinant of the outcome. Section 3 outlines a Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) model for Scotland, which is used to explore the likely impact of 
raising average tax rates to Scandinavian levels, with the increment to revenues being recycled 
to finance increased public expenditure. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2.  The Scandinavian Model 
Some key aspects of the Scandinavian economies are summarised first. Then the likely 
consequences of Scotland seeking to emulate these economies by imposing a significant 
balanced budget rise in income tax rates are discussed. 
 
The Scandinavian Economies 
Keating and Harvey (2014) identify two ideal-type contrasting strategies for dealing with 
globalization and other changes: market liberalism, associated inter alia with the Baltic States, 
and the “social investment state, in which public expenditure is seen as a contribution to the 
productive economy rather than a drain on it” (op. cit, p12), associated with the Scandinavian 
                                                          
3 In fact, even the income tax powers devolved in April 2016, as a consequence of the Scotland Act 2012 allowed this. 
4 Borrowing powers remain limited and so we focus here on a balanced budget adjustment. 
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economies. In this model, the role of the state is much more predominant than in other Western 
economies. 
 
Table 1 gives the average personal taxation level as a share of labour costs for the UK and 
Scandinavian economies (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden here).  Total tax revenue as a 
percentage of average wage levels was 7.4 percentage points higher in the Scandinavian 
economies (at 38.8%) than in the UK (31.4%) in 2013.  Social security contributions as a 
percentage of GDP were also significantly larger in Scandinavia (10.9% compared to 6.4%) as, 
generally, are both direct and indirect taxes. Similarly, the VAT rate was higher at 24.8% as 
compared to 20% for the same year. These figures suggest that, as Keating and Harvey (2014) 
write, the state plays a larger role in the Scandinavian economy than is the case in the UK. 
 
Table 1. Average personal income taxes as a percentage of labour costs, 2013 
 
 
% of average labour 
costs 
 
Denmark 36.4%  
Finland 43.1%  
Iceland 34.1%  
Norway 37.3%  
Sweden 43.0%  
United Kingdom 31.4%  
Scandinavian Average 38.8%  
Source: OECD (2016) 
 
Apart from the higher tax and spending levels of the Scandinavian economies, they also exhibit 
important institutional differences from the UK, which are crucial to the way in which these 
states operate. For example, the “tripartite bargaining” system in the Scandinavian economies 
is characterised by national wage negotiations which include workers’ unions, employers’ 
associations and the government. Further, this system is subject to an annual bargaining cycle, 
which is believed to reduce tensions in these negotiations that are commonly observed in other 
European economies, such as Germany (Keating & Harvey, 2014). A second institutional 
difference is represented by the principle of “universalism”. This concept implies that even the 
middle-class is included in the benefit system. Most of society is included in the social system, 
ensuring the maintenance of social solidarity, which allows the system to thrive (Keating & 
Harvey, 2014).5 
                                                          
5 The principle was also upheld in economic crises, including the recent financial crisis of 2008.  During those periods, 
the Scandinavian economies continued to pursue their ‘social investment state’, instead of the austerity measures 
observed in other Western economies. However, prolonged downturns put a strain on the system, which relies on 
near full-employment levels to allow for its inclusive social solidarity system (Keating & Harvey, 2014). 
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Acemoglu et al (2012) maintains that the success of the Scandinavian model is attributable to 
“cuddly capitalism”, which free rides on “cutthroat capitalism” (such as that in the US) pushing 
out the World’s technology frontier. Barth et al (2014) argues that the success of the 
Scandinavian economies in terms of economic growth, high productivity, low wage dispersion 
and a big welfare state reflects what is, in effect, a two-level bargaining system. A local system 
supplements the national system described above and strong unions both suppress wage 
dispersion and enhance local productivity. The latter is generated through inducing greater 
worker effort and higher capitalist investment. Furthermore, the wage compression and 
productivity enhancement encourage political support for welfare spending.  
 
It is clear that there is more to emulating the “Scandinavian model” than simply raising income 
taxes to Scandinavian levels and using the resultant revenues to increase current government 
spending; institutional differences are also central. The analysis that follows focusses particularly 
on the valuation of government expenditures and the nature of the wage bargaining process. 
 
Towards a Scandinavian Model: the importance of wage bargaining 
What would be the likely consequences of a Scottish Government moving towards the 
Scandinavian model by significantly raising the average tax rate and recycling the revenues to 
expand current government expenditure? The answer proves to depend crucially on the value 
placed on the enhanced public services and the reaction of wage bargainers. For simplicity, we 
assume that the increase in government expenditure per se has no immediate supply-side 
impact beyond the creation of a local amenity.6  
 
We adopt the long-run, open-economy model of the region of Lecca et al (2014), which is based 
on the disaggregated analysis of Layard et al. (1991, Ch. 6), with imperfect competition in the 
regional labour market. Here we focus on a comparative-static long-run analysis where 
equilibrium implies that both the regional capital stock and population are optimally adjusted. 
Long-run equilibria are therefore characterised by zero net investment and zero net migration.  
 
In this framework the long-run equilibrium of the regional economy is determined by the 
interaction of two relationships between the regional employment (unemployment) rate and 
the real consumption wage: the zero net migration condition and the bargaining function (wage 
                                                          
6 This assumption rules out the potential productivity-enhancing effects of such spending (e.g. through education and 
health) that e.g. Barth et al (2014) would emphasise, a point we return to below. 
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curve). Following Layard et al (1991), and many other authors, net migration is a positive function 
of the inter-regional relative real wage and employment rates.7 This yields a condition for zero 
net migration, given in equation (1). This identifies the set of values of the post-tax real 
consumption wage, w, and the employment rate, e, for which net migration is zero: 
 
(1 ) ( ) 0;1 0; 1; , 0ew z e z w w

              (1) 
 
where is the proportionate rate of income tax and β is a parameter indicating the degree to 
which households value public, as against private, consumption. Equation (1), ZNM0 in Figure 1, 
indicates that there is a negative relationship between the post-tax real wage and the 
employment rate: across zero net migration (long-run) equilibria, a low local wage is 
compensated for by a high local employment rate. However, following Lecca et al (2014) the 
equation includes the term 
 )1(  in an attempt to capture the effect on the migration decision 
of the locally financed amenity. 
 
Figure 1. The long-run impact of a balanced-budget fiscal expansion. 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 This function has its roots in Harris and Todaro (1970) and has been widely employed elsewhere. See for example 
Greenwood et al (1991). 
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Where individuals attach no value to this amenity β = 0 and the standard formulation of the net 
migration condition applies, with the post-tax real consumption wage governing migration 
decisions. However if, as is emphasised in the literature on fiscal federalism, there is a positive 
amenity effect, then β > 0, and the value of this parameter measures the potential migrant's 
relative marginal valuation of public expenditure versus private consumption. For a given 
employment rate, this implies that the larger the value of β, the lower the post-tax real 
consumption wage required to preclude net outmigration.  When β = 1, the potential migrant is 
indifferent between marginal changes in local public expenditure and private consumption so 
that in this case the pre-tax real consumption wage drives migration.8  
 
Through the regional real wage curve or bargained real wage function, BRW0 in Figure 1, the real 
(post tax) consumption wage is positively related to the regional employment rate (Layard et al, 
1991): 
 
 1 ( ) 0, , , 0,0 1ew b e b w w w

             
(2) 
 
In this formulation of the regional bargaining function, the local amenity generated by the 
expenditure is allowed to influence wage bargaining behaviour directly.  The parameter α, which 
takes a value between 0 and 1, reflects the extent to which the value of the amenity is taken into 
account in the wage bargaining process (Lecca et al, 2014). 
 
Where labour markets are competitive, since the amenity provision is exogenous to the 
individual worker, it is ignored in the individual's work/leisure choice, so that only the post-tax 
real consumption wage matters.9 This corresponds to a situation where the value of α is zero.  
However, in the bargaining context the public good externality will be internalised in so far as 
local unions cover a significant section of the labour force and act co-operatively. Given that the 
scale of the amenity is tied directly to income and therefore to the bargained wage, the value of 
α will rise above zero. If α is unity the marginal valuation of the amenity is fully reflected in 
workers’ bargaining behaviour.  
 
We now consider the likely impact of a balanced budget fiscal expansion. In general, the impact 
of a balanced budget fiscal expansion generates two countervailing forces (Lecca et al, 2014). 
                                                          
8 That is to say, the individual is indifferent between £1 marginal private consumption and the public good implications 
of paying £1 more in tax. 
9 The labour supply decision could, of course, be influenced by the amenity if, for example, the amenity were 
complementary to leisure. 
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One is that there is a net stimulus to demand: a balanced budget expansion essentially shifts 
spending from private to public consumption. However, the fall in private consumption due to 
the rise in income taxation, is more than offset by an expansion in government expenditure, 
since the latter is less import-intensive. The second is a negative competitiveness effect: if taxes 
go up workers feel worse off and attempt to restore their real consumption wages through 
increased wage claims. The nature and scale of the competitiveness effect depends critically on 
migration and wage bargaining behaviour. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the initial long-run equilibrium of the regional economy, which is established 
at point A in employment rate - nominal wage space, where the initial bargained real wage curve, 
BRW0, and zero net migration curve, ZNM0, intersect (Lecca et al, 2014).10 We next consider the 
impact of a balanced budget fiscal expansion under three alternative visions of regional labour 
markets that imply different values of the parameters α and β. 
 
In the Conventional Macro model neither local residents nor potential migrants place any value 
on the increase in public consumption following the balanced budget expansion so that α=β=0, 
and the standard (neoclassical) specifications of the net migration and bargained real wage 
curves apply, with  after tax real consumption wages governing both migration and bargaining 
decisions. This approach is embedded in many studies of net regional migration and of regional 
wage curves. In this case the ZNM function in Figure 1 shifts vertically upwards by the amount 
required to restore the real post tax wage. At any given employment rate the nominal wage has 
to rise by the amount required to offset the rise in the tax rate and the increase in the CPI to 
ensure zero net migration. The BRW function is shifted up vertically by exactly the same amount 
(since β = 0 in (2)), to maintain a given post tax real wage at any given employment rate. In the 
new long-run equilibrium, at point B in Figure 1, the real post-tax wage is restored to its original 
level, as is the employment (and unemployment) rate.  
 
In this case workers bargain for a net of tax real wage, and there is upward pressure on wages 
and prices, which creates an adverse competitiveness effect, as workers seek to restore their 
real take home pay. The more open the economy, in terms of share of imports and 
responsiveness to relative price changes, the greater the adverse demand effects associated 
with the loss of competitiveness. Migration responds only to net of tax real wage and 
unemployment differentials in this case. Given a predominant adverse competitiveness effect, 
                                                          
10 In fact both relationships are formulated in terms of the real consumption wage. They are here transformed in 
nominal wage relationships so that we can clarify competitiveness effects.  
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real post tax wages initially fall, unemployment rises and net out-migration occurs until real wage 
and unemployment rates are restored (at lower levels of population and employment).   
 
In microeconomic models of fiscal federalism (e.g. Tiebout, 1956), potential migrants value the 
increase in public services provided by the relevant authority and factor that into their migration 
decisions. The is the basis of the Conventional Micro model, in which we assume that migrants 
are motivated by their ‘social wage’, which we take to be unaffected by the balanced-budget 
fiscal expansion: migrants value the increased public spending equally to the foregone private 
wage as  a result  of the income  tax increase so that β = 1. However, this valuation is not reflected 
in regional wage bargaining so that α = 0. In Figure 1, the BRW curve shifts vertically upwards by 
the same amount as under the Conventional Macro model, but in this case, since β = 1, the ZNM 
curve does not shift in response to the hike in taxes because migrants value the increased public 
spending as much as they do the loss of consumption, and so feel no worse off after the fiscal 
expansion. Long-run equilibrium occurs at point C where the nominal wage increases (but not 
sufficiently to restore the real wage), and the employment (unemployment) rate falls (rises). 
While the unemployment rate rises in this case, the extent of the adverse supply shock is less 
than under the Conventional Macroeconomic case, with nominal wages rising less, so that 
employment and GDP effects are improved and any induced net out-migration reduced. 
 
In the Social Wage case the increase in public consumption is valued equally to the loss in 
private consumption, and that valuation is fully reflected in the regional wage bargaining process 
so α=β=1. In terms of the long-run equilibrium in Figure 1, neither the ZNM nor the BRW curves 
are affected by the hike in taxes: both depend only on the pre-tax wage, and the long-run 
equilibrium of the nominal wage and employment rate is unaffected. This reflects the fact that 
workers value the increase in government consumption as much as their foregone private 
consumption, so that they feel as well-off after the change as they did before. Accordingly, 
workers do not push to restore their take-home wage following the policy change, and the 
adverse competitiveness effect is eliminated completely. In this case, therefore, the beneficial 
net demand stimulus associated with the fiscal expansion predominates, and output and 
employment expand, in a manner similar to that envisaged in the simple Keynesian balanced 
budget multiplier. However, the whole of the increase in tax (and induced effects on the cpi) is 
reflected in a significant reduction in the post-tax wage.  
 
What public evidence do we have that relates to the likely values of α and β? In fact, there is a 
dearth of relevant evidence. While there is a longstanding presumption that Scotland is “more 
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left wing” than the rest of the UK (RUK) with a preference for higher public spending and 
taxation, this does not appear to be borne out by survey evidence. For example, Bell and Eiser 
(2015) find no statistically significant difference, for various indicators of political attitudes, 
between Scottish and RUK respondents to the British Social Attitudes survey. Furthermore, while 
the majority of respondents to ESRC-commissioned surveys in 2014 (after the Referendum) 
wanted to see greater devolution of fiscal powers to Scotland, only a minority wanted to see 
rates that differed from those in the RUK. This apparent contradiction may reduce to an issue 
over which Government – at Holyrood or Westminster - commands greater trust (Bell and Eisner, 
2015). On average, respondents wanted to see lower taxes and higher welfare benefits, which 
would very probably violate the balanced budget constraint of the present analysis. 
 
However, there are at least two further points that should be noted here. First, while individual 
survey data do not appear to support the notion of distinctive Scottish political attitudes, the 
results of successive elections can be interpreted as suggesting otherwise. The Scottish results 
of the 2015 UK general election saw the elimination of all but a single Labour and Lib-Dem MP, 
joining the single MP that the Conservatives had had for some years. That result was widely 
regarded as a reaction against  a Labour Party that had shared a platform with the other Unionist 
parties in the independence Referendum and which had been perceived to be “light” in its 
opposition to the “austerity” programme of the previous UK Government (in contrast to the 
perception of the SNP’s positioning). The significant advance of the Scottish Conservatives, in 
the 2017 UK general election (in contrast to the experience of the national party) is seen, in large 
part, as a reaction to the SNP’s proposed second independence referendum (although they also 
committed to retain parity with UK income tax rates). IndeRef2 is itself a response to the 
outcome of the Brexit Referendum in which the majority of Scots voted to remain in the EU. The 
relative success of the Scottish (and UK) Labour Parties in the recent UK election is seen, in part, 
as reflecting enthusiasm for the Party’s clear anti-austerity platform. 
 
Second, as we have already noted, Scotland is in the process of a radical change of historic 
importance that renders it one of the most powerful devolved authorities in Europe: an 
irreversible sea change in terms of the fiscal powers of the Scottish Parliament is now well 
underway. In this new context political parties may seek to alter public attitudes towards 
changes in taxes and public spending, perhaps through some degree of incremental 
hypothecation. 
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The Social Wage case comes closest to reflecting the outcome of the centralized tripartite 
bargaining of the Scandinavian model. One key issue, however, is whether the Scottish 
bargaining system is likely to deliver such an outcome. Of course, there is no “tripartite 
bargaining” system in Scotland presently, and the shift would require the Government to take a 
much bigger role in the bargaining system than it currently has. Furthermore, in the UK 
(Scotland) only 26.1% (31.6%) of the workforce is unionized (Department of Business, Innovation 
and Skills, 2015), compared to 64% in Scandinavia in 2012 (Table 1).  
 
Nevertheless, the current wage bargaining system in Scotland may appear to offer some support 
for the Social Wage outcome, since many workers are covered by UK-wide bargaining 
agreements. From a Scottish perspective, this effectively means that their nominal wage is fixed, 
which would preclude any adverse competitiveness effect from this group of workers.11 The 
Traditional Keynesian model implied by a fixed nominal wage would closely emulate the social 
wage model, exhibiting the traditional demand-driven character of Keynesian models of the 
regional macro-economy. However, if workers do not in fact value the enhanced public services 
sufficiently to feel as well off as they did prior to the rise in tax and spending, there would remain 
pressure in the long-run to establish a supplementary regional bargaining system, and the 
system would ultimately behave as the Conventional Macro model. 
 
For those not covered by nation-wide bargaining, there is a lot of international evidence 
supporting the notion that wage bargaining essentially operates around real take home pay, 
exactly as in the Conventional Macro model. However, the recent very prolonged recession has 
depressed wages, but in the longer-term bargaining seems likely to focus again on net of tax real 
wages. So the current wage bargaining systems in Scotland seems unlikely to deliver Social Wage 
outcomes, at least over the longer term, without some fairly radical reform of the bargaining 
system. 
 
3. The computable general equilibrium (CGE) model  
This section provides a brief, non-technical overview of AMOS (A Macro-micro model Of 
Scotland), a regional CGE model, which we use to simulate the impact of a balanced budget fiscal 
expansion that raises the average Scottish income tax rate to Scandinavian levels. The version 
employed here is the forward-looking model (Lecca et al, 2013) calibrated on the 2009 Scottish 
SAM (Emonts-Holley et al, 2014). 
                                                          
11 However, the exogeneity of the nominal wage is guaranteed by our single-region analysis of the present paper. That 
restriction would not hold in an explicitly interregional context where the UK nominal wage would be endogenous, 
although relatively stable in this particular case of a Scottish-specific change. 
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AMOS is essentially a regional, multi-sectoral, forward looking variant of the Layard, Nickell, and 
Jackman (1991) model. In the long-run equilibrium of this economy all stocks are optimally 
adjusted and so it is characterised by both zero net migration and zero net investment. In the 
short-run, all sectoral capital stocks and population are fixed. AMOS has three domestic 
transactor groups, namely, households, firms and government; and four major components of 
final demand: consumption, investment, government expenditure and exports. In the version 
used here there are eighteen commodities/activities. 
 
Here we use the intertemporal variant of the model with perfect foresight, the full specification 
of which can be found in Lecca et al. (2013, 2014). Government expenditure is equal to its base 
year level plus the increment to revenues attributable to the rise in the average income tax rate, 
so that revenues become dependent on the entire general equilibrium of the system. In fact, 
under the new Fiscal Framework government expenditure is still partly funded through the 
Barnett formula, subject to block grant adjustments. However, here we want to focus on a 
balanced budget fiscal expansion, in which all income tax revenues from the increase in income 
tax are recycled increased current spending. The demand for Scottish exports is determined by 
export demand functions with a price elasticity of demand of 2.0. Imports are modelled by an 
Armington link (Armington, 1969) with trade substitution elasticities of 2.0 (Gibson, 1990). 
 
In all the simulations there is a single representative household and a unified Scottish labour 
market with perfect sectoral mobility. All sectors are taken to be perfectly competitive and 
produce using multi-level CES production functions. The elasticity of substitution in the 
production of gross output and value added is 0.3 and is Leontief for intermediate demands 
(Harris, 1989). We do not explicitly model financial flows: Scotland is a price-taker in competitive 
UK financial markets.  
 
The size of the labour force only varies due to net migration flows, modelled in accordance with 
Layard et al (1991), but incorporating the amenity effects discussed in Section 2. Net migration 
is positively related to real after tax wage differential, and negatively related to the difference 
between regional and national unemployment rates: 
 
0.08 ln( ) ln( ) 0.06 ln ln(1 ) ln
S R
S R
S R
w w
m u u
cpi cpi
  
    
            
    
 
(3) 
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Where: m is net in-migration as a proportion of the Scottish population; u is the regional 
unemployment rate; the S and R superscripts stand for Scotland and the Rest of the UK, 
respectively; and ς is a parameter calibrated to generate zero net migration in the base period. 
As before, β is the parameter indicating the extent to which households value public, as against 
private, consumption. It represents the subjective net valuation by households of the benefits 
of the increased public expenditures weighed against the corresponding increase in their income 
tax.  
 
As we have seen, in the Conventional Macro model households attach no value to the amenity 
created by the increased expenditures so that β = 0 and the standard specification of the net 
migration function applies, with after tax real consumption wages governing migration decisions. 
However, if public expenditure generates a positive amenity, so that households attach any 
value at all to the services produced by the additional expenditure, then β > 0. For a given 
unemployment rate, the larger the value of β, the lower the post-tax real consumption wage 
required to preclude net outmigration.  In the Conventional Micro and Social Wage models β = 
1, and the potential migrant is indifferent between marginal changes in public expenditure and 
private consumption, so that in this case the pre-tax real consumption wage governs migration.12  
 
Wage setting reflects the bargained real wage curve estimated by Layard et al (1991), again 
augmented by amenity effects: 
 
   ln 0.113ln ln 1
S
S
S
w
 = c  u  + 
cpi
 
 
  
 
 (4) 
 
Where: α, as before, represents the extent to which the amenity effect is reflected in the wage 
bargain and c is a calibrated parameter.13 In the Conventional Macro model both α and β equal 
zero and the last term on the RHS of (2) is zero. In this case (2) implies that bargaining is over the 
real net of tax consumption wage. In the Conventional Micro model β equals unity, but α=0, so 
that again (2) simplifies to the conventional wage curve specification. However, in the Social 
Wage case β=α=1. In this case (2) implies that workers bargain over the pre-tax real wage: the 
tax hike has no impact on the bargained wage. 
 
                                                          
12 That is to say, the representative worker is indifferent between £1 marginal private consumption and the public 
good implications of a local fiscal arrangement where he or she pays £1 more in tax. 
13 A wage curve elasticity of around -0.1 has been found over a large number of empirical studies across different 
countries and time periods (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2005).    
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4. Results 
This Section simulates a rise in the average rate of income tax in Scotland of 7.4 percentage 
points, the change required to match average tax rates in Scandinavia (Table 1). The resultant 
tax revenues are used to fund a rise in current government consumption.14 The permanent rise 
in the income tax rate is applied in period 1 and the model is run for 50 periods.  
 
Aggregate results 
Table 2 shows the long-run impacts, in terms of percentage changes from the initial steady state, 
generated by the balanced-budget fiscal expansion. The increase in the average rate of income 
tax of 7.4 percentage points. The resultant stimulus to government consumption is positive in 
the long run in each case, but is noticeably greater in the Social Wage model.  The overall impacts 
on the other broad macroeconomic indicators shown in Table 2 are fairly similar for the 
Conventional Macro and Micro cases, but the Social Wage results differ markedly. 
 
The first column of Table 2 reports results for the Conventional Macro model. In this case, neither 
potential migrants nor workers value public consumption. Accordingly, migrants respond to the 
net of tax real wage, as do workers who seek to restore the initial value of their real take home 
pay (and, in the long-run succeed in doing so). Therefore there is no change in the post-tax real 
wage or in the unemployment rate in the long run, corresponding to the shift in long-run 
equilibrium from A to B in Figure 1. While public expenditure rises by 7.1%, the long run impact 
of the fiscal expansion is contractionary, with a fall of 8.5% in Gross Value Added (GVA) and 9.0% 
in employment. It is clear that, for Scotland, the adverse competitiveness effect of the balanced 
budget fiscal stimulus dominates the net stimulus to demand, reflecting the degree of openness 
of the Scottish economy, with exports to both RUK and ROW falling by 6.9% and 7.2% 
respectively. 
 
The adverse competitiveness effect is apparent in the substantial rise in the nominal gross wage 
(of 17.1%) and the CPI (of nearly 5%), as workers successfully restore the initial value of their real 
take home pay.  Due to the zero net migration condition, which is binding in long-run equilibrium, 
the unemployment and real wage rates are ultimately restored to their initial values through a 
process of net outmigration, confirming the analysis of Figure 1. The rise in the average rate of 
income tax naturally lowers household consumption, in this case by 5.4% in the long run.   
                                                          
14 This balanced budget change is equivalent to revenue recycling in this case because income tax is here assumed to 
be the only devolved tax. 
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Table 2. The long run impact of a balanced-budget 7.4 percentage point rise in the average 
income tax rate 
 
  
Conventional 
Macro 
Conventional 
Micro 
Social  
Wage 
  7.4 pp 7.4 pp 7.4 pp 
Gross Value Added -8.52% -7.77% 1.92% 
Consumer Price Index 4.96% 4.57% 0.00% 
Unemployment Rate 0.00% 7.87% 0.00% 
Employment -9.02% -8.17% 2.95% 
Gross Nominal Wage 17.11% 15.69% 0.00% 
Nominal Wage after Tax 4.96% 3.68% -10.38% 
Gross Real Wage 11.58% 10.63% 0.00% 
Real Wage after Tax 0.00% -0.85% -10.38% 
Labour Income 6.55% 6.24% 2.95% 
Capital Income -4.00% -3.68% 0.52% 
Labour supply -9.02% -7.70% 2.95% 
Household Consumption -5.39% -5.30% -3.94% 
Government Consumption 7.14% 7.83% 16.76% 
Export RUK -6.92% -6.41% 0.00% 
Export ROW -7.21% -6.69% 0.00% 
 
 
The second column in Table 2 reports the long-run results for the Conventional Micro model.  
Here potential migrants value the increase in public consumption, but workers do not moderate 
their wage claims accordingly. Typically, Conventional Micro models abstract from the presence 
of imperfect competition in labour markets, so that the improved amenity is an externality from 
the individual worker’s perspective and, in effect, α = 0. The fiscal expansion results in a rise in 
public consumption of 7.8% in the long run, but GVA falls by 7.8%, and employment by 8.2%. 
Given the predominant adverse competitiveness effect observed in the Conventional Macro 
model, the scale of the resultant contraction in this case is less.  As before, in the short-run real 
wages fall and unemployment rate rises, inducing net outmigration. However, the scale of the 
response is now less than before since migrants are, in effect, motivated by the Social Wage in 
Scotland, not by the net of tax wage. Accordingly, migration does not continue until real net of 
tax wages and unemployment rates return to their initial levels. While workers continue to 
attempt to restore their real wage this increases the unemployment rate and lowers their 
bargaining power. A lower real take home wage rate is now compatible with the zero net 
migration equilibrium, given that potential migrants in Scotland and RUK value their higher Social 
Wage, as reflected in the move from long-run equilibrium A to C in Figure 1. 
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Workers are in this case unable to restore their net take home pay, although the pressure on 
wages remains significant, with the nominal gross wage rising by 10.6%. Essentially, labour 
supply remains greater in this scenario than in the Conventional Macro case because migrants 
are less willing to move out of Scotland at any given net of tax real wage, and so the upward 
pressure on the real wage due to outmigration is less in this case. Consequently, unemployment 
rate increases even over the long run, (by 7.9%). 
 
Overall, the aggregate results of the Conventional Macro and Micro models are very similar, 
reflecting the predominance of adverse competitiveness effects in both cases, although the 
behaviour of the real wage and unemployment rates differs, reflecting the different models of 
migration embedded within them. However, the results of the Social Wage model, summarized 
in the last column of Table 2, are very different from both Conventional models. In this case 
workers do not bargain to restore their take-home wage, since the increase in government 
expenditure compensates them for the reduction in their take home pay and nor do migrants 
require compensation for lower take home pay. The economy remains in a long-run equilibrium 
like A in Figure 1, where neither the nominal wage nor the employment (or unemployment rate) 
change.  However, we know that in this case there is no adverse supply effect, and so the (net) 
stimulus to demand predominates. Here the balanced budget  fiscal expansion produces a rise 
of 16.8% in government consumption in the long run and generates a rise in GVA of 1.9% and in 
employment of nearly 3.0%. 
 
Since workers do not seek to restore their net take home pay there is no upward pressure on 
the nominal wage or the CPI in the long run.  The real wage after tax therefore experiences a 
substantial fall of approximately 10.4% in the long run (which accounts for the rise in 
employment exceeding that in GVA).  Due to this fall and the tax hike, household consumption 
declines by over 3.9% in this case. Exports are unchanged in the long run as the competitiveness 
of the region is ultimately unaffected.  
 
The social wage model effectively eliminates any adverse supply shock associated with the fiscal 
stimulus, by preventing any upward pressure on the nominal wage. However, this implies a 
willingness by workers to accept a substantial cut, of 10.4%, in their real take home pay.  In the 
long-run this model operates “as if” it is an input-output system, in which the supply side is 
entirely passive and wages and prices are unaffected.  We obtain results very similar to simple 
Keynesian balanced-budget multipliers, which are positive, although here both population and 
capital stocks are endogenous. 
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It is clear that the overall impact of a balanced budget fiscal expansion is crucially dependent on 
the public’s valuation of the amenity associated with the greater public expenditure, and 
especially to the extent to which this is reflected in workers’ wage bargaining behaviour.  
 
Figure 2. Adjustment Paths: Macro Case versus Social Wage 
 
 
The adjustment paths for GVA and employment for the Conventional Macro and Social Wage 
models are presented in Figure 2.15 Adjustment to the new long-run equilibrium values (which 
are shown in Table 2) takes somewhat longer in the Conventional Macro case, in part reflecting 
the scale of the changes, particularly in wages and prices. The period-by-period results show that 
the contraction induced by the predominant adverse competitiveness effect in the Conventional 
Macro model leads to a fall in GVA and, given the upward pressure on the real wages following 
the tax hike (Figure 2), the greater fall in employment observed in Table 2. In contrast GVA and 
employment both rise in the Social Wage model, with the impact on employment greater given 
the fall in the real post-tax wage. Initially, the social wage increases which, together with the fall 
                                                          
15 The dynamics of the Conventional Micro and Macro models are very similar, except that unemployment and real 
wage rates do not return to their initial levels in the former case. 
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in unemployment rate, induces in-migration. This process pushes down the private element of 
the social wage until the nominal gross wage is restored to its original level. The very different 
movements in nominal wages in the two models reflect the contrasting motivations for wage 
bargaining: with significant upward pressure in the Conventional Macro model, and a return to 
base year levels in the Social Wage case (following an initial rise). These largely account for the 
contrast in competitiveness changes in the two models. While real wage and unemployment 
rates ultimately return to their base year levels in the Conventional Macro model, the levels of 
employment and population are much lower (by over 9%) than in the base year. 
 
Sectorally disaggregated Results 
Figure 3 reports the long run results for sectoral value added changes for all three models.  In 
both Conventional Models, the rise in the average rate of income tax results in a contraction in 
seventeen of the eighteen sectors, the only exception being public administration, education 
and health, in which government current expenditure is concentrated. This reflects the relative 
sensitivities to the loss of competitiveness as well as the contraction in consumption and the 
initial distribution of the rise in government expenditure. The extent of the contraction increases 
over time in each case as a consequence of net out-migration and disinvestment.  
 
Overall, the contractionary impacts on the private sectors are significantly less under the social 
wage case. Ultimately prices are unaffected in this case, and there is a substitution of 
government spending for consumption, against the background of an expanding economy. Here 
the public administration  sectors are not alone in being stimulated by the balanced budget 
expansion, with Water Sewage and Waste, Other Services, Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals, and 
Construction all expanding, reflecting a combination of sensitivity to consumption contractions, 
demand-side linkages to Public Administration, Education and Health, and sensitivity to 
improving competitiveness. Of course, commodity prices rise only in the short run so that 
exports are crowded out only over that interval and return to their initial level in the long run for 
all three sectors. The input-output character of the long-run results in the Social Wage model is 
apparent from the sectorally disaggregated results: within each sector output, employment and 
valued added all change equi-proportionately.  
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Figure 3. Sectorally disaggregated results – Change in GVA 
 
Note on Sectors:  Agriculture, forestry and fishing (AFF), Other primary (OTP), Food and drink (FAD), Textile, Leather, 
Wood, Paper, Printing (TLW), Chemicals and Pharmaceutical (CEP), Rubber, Cement, Glass, Metals (RCG), Electrical 
Manufacturing (ELM), Mechanical and Other Manufacturing (incl. Repair) (MOM), Electricity, transmission and 
distribution (ETD), Gas; distribution of gaseous fuels through mains; steam and air conditioning supply (GDS), Water, 
sewerage and Waste (WSW), Construction – Buildings (CON), Wholesale and Retail Trade, Transportation and Storage, 
accommodation, food and services (WRT), Information and Communication (IAC), Financial services, insurance and 
services (FIN), Real Estate, professional act., R&D (RES), Pub. Admin, Education and Health (PUB), Other services (OTS). 
 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
Recall that the simulation analysed so far relates to a 7.4 percentage point increase in the 
average income tax rate in Scotland, with income tax revenues being recycled to allow an 
expansion in current government expenditure. Figure 4 shows the long run percentage change 
in GRP resulting from a range of balanced budget 1 to 10 percentage point rises in the average 
rate of income tax under the three models.  
 
The results indicate that only in the Social Wage model are higher average rates of income tax 
associated with increases in GRP.  In contrast, in the Conventional Macro and Micro models 
higher average rates of income tax are associated with falling GRP, although the extent of the 
contraction is always greater in the former model for the reasons discussed above. The greater 
sensitivity of GRP to balanced budget fiscal expansions in the Conventional Macro and Micro 
models reflects the degree of openness of the Scottish economy, which is crucial in determining 
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the relative strength of the adverse competitiveness effect associated with any increase in 
taxation. 
 
Figure 4. Change in the income tax rate, percentage points 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
Scotland has recently acquired very substantial powers over income tax. Currently, the Scottish 
Government has to set a Scottish Rate of Income Tax (SRIT)16, and its powers were further 
significantly enhanced when the provisions of the Scotland Act 2016 are implemented from 
2017.  Of course, it would always be possible to set a SRIT to ensure that, overall, income tax 
rates are equal to those in RUK so as to maintain the status quo, and this was indeed what 
happened when the rate was first set in 2016. However, differences in tax policies among the 
political parties began to emerge in the 2015 Scottish Parliamentary elections; now only the 
Conservatives remain committed to the maintenance of income tax parity with the rest of the 
UK. Furthermore, a number of commentators, including prominent supporters, believe that the 
SNP will have to further alter its position on income tax if it is to sustain its current and planned 
                                                          
16 Indeed a Scottish Rate Resolution had been expected by the autumn, but this has been delayed. 
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future commitment to the maintenance of its distinctive policies on, for example, student fees 
and some service charges, while defending health and education services, in the face of 
Westminster’s austerity policy. 
 
This paper explores the likely impact of a radical shift in the direction of the Scandinavian 
model, characterized by high taxes and high public spending, a shift made feasible by the 
enhanced fiscal autonomy that Scotland now enjoys. The main message from our analysis is that 
the nature of the wage bargaining system seems crucial to the likely macroeconomic outcome 
of a significant rise in income taxes and public spending. If the public amenity created by higher 
public spending is not valued by migrants or workers, and bargaining is not restricted by weak 
labour market conditions, the openness of the Scottish economy is likely to result in a balanced 
budget fiscal expansion having contractionary aggregate effects. If, on the other hand, the higher 
public spending is valued as much as the forgone private consumption, and this is reflected in 
workers effectively bargaining over the Social Wage, there is no adverse competitiveness effect, 
and the result is (a more modest) expansion in economic activity. 
 
The Social Wage outcome is, however, necessarily associated with a significant fall in real take 
home pay, and the key question is how likely it is that Scottish workers would be willing to accept 
that in return for the maintenance or enhancement of public services. The current wage 
bargaining system in Scotland seems unlikely to deliver Social Wage outcomes, at least over the 
longer term. Accordingly, our results suggest that, if a move towards Scandinavian levels of 
public services and taxes was judged to be appropriate, it would be essential to seek reform of 
the bargaining system if adverse macroeconomic consequences were to be avoided. 
Alternatively, some form of incomes policy linked to the provision of public services might be 
pursued. 
 
Of course, the case we consider here – of an immediate hike in taxes to Scandinavian levels - is 
unrealistic in that any move in that direction would likely be much more cautious and gradual. 
But it seems doubtful that ad hoc agreements linking moderated wage responses to incremental 
increases in public spending for particular purposes would be feasible within the current 
bargaining system. However, it seems likely that workers’ attitudes to increased public spending, 
and therefore to either reform of the bargaining system or some form of incomes policy, will 
depend on the composition of that spending. For example, US evidence suggests that spending 
on health and education has a positive effect, but spending on welfare has a negative impact on 
working migrants.  
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While the Scandinavian model has often been held up as an example that a Scotland with 
sufficient fiscal autonomy might like to emulate, few have advocated the kind of radical change 
considered in this paper. Indeed until the recent Scottish Parliamentary elections there had been 
surprisingly little debate about what the government should actually do with its new powers. 
Furthermore, while there has been a longstanding presumption that Scotland is “more left wing” 
than the rest of the UK (RUK) with a preference for higher public spending and taxation, this does 
not appear to be borne out by survey evidence. However, public attitudes may change with 
increasing pressure on the budgets available for public spending as a consequence of UK 
austerity policies, which seem set to continue in the light of the outcome of the recent UK 
general election. In any event it is important for Scottish governments of whatever hue to 
understand the likely effects of any deviation from income tax parity with RUK. Without such an 
understanding there can be no appreciation of the potential costs and benefits of maintaining 
the status quo, as against alternative policies. While we have begun to address this issue here, 
there are a number of aspects that need to be more thoroughly explored in future research. 
 
First, we have considered only one of the options facing the Scottish Government. It would be 
useful to investigate the use of the new tax powers to move towards the low tax/ low public 
spending associated with the Baltic economies, although this is a shift that few in Scotland have 
advocated. Here competitiveness effects may act to stimulate the economy, although outcomes 
will again depend on the valuation of any change in public spending, and the extent to which 
that is reflected in the wage bargaining system. 
 
Second, there is a need to explore the valuation of public spending more systematically, in 
particular its dependence on the composition of government spending, and on the source of that 
spending, in terms of the level of government.17  Third, there is requirement for a better 
understanding of any immediate supply-side consequences of changes in government spending. 
This is perhaps most obviously relevant when we consider government capital expenditure, but 
would also apply to those aspects of current government spending, which in fact represent 
investment in human capital and so would also be expected to have important supply-side 
impacts (e.g. Hermannsson et al, 2014). The presence of such a stimulus introduces a beneficial 
supply side impact that tends to counter the competitiveness effects, but the former takes time 
to emerge, and so such changes may continue to have adverse macroeconomic consequences, 
                                                          
17 There is also scope for examining a range of alternative models, reflecting different valuations of government 
expenditure (by category), and different wage bargaining responses. 
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even in the medium run, in the absence of Social Wage bargaining (Lecca et al, 2017) or sources 
of nominal wage inflexibility. This timing of effects could lead policy makers to lay undue 
emphasis on the short-to-medium term outcomes and this may act to inhibit investments in 
physical and human capital that are worthwhile from a longer term perspective.  
 
Fourth, identifying the impact of fiscal changes on the distribution of income across households 
of different income groups is clearly of policy interest given the current emphasis on inclusive 
growth. Fifth, it would be instructive to move away from the strictly balanced-budget changes 
considered here to explore the impact of fiscal policy within the new Fiscal Framework. Finally, 
extension to an interregional setting to explore the direction and scale of spillovers and their 
implications for the “no detriment” principle of the Smith Commission would provide valuable 
insights for the impact of differential tax regimes between Scotland and RUK (Lecca et al, 2015). 
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